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LAW AS POLITICS: A RESPONSE TO
ADAM BABICH
STEPHEN WIZNER AND ROBERT SOLOMON*
Way back in the 1960s, an era in which many people think we are
still mired, we each made a career decision to be lawyers for poor
people. While the road over the past thirty-five years has taken sev-
eral twists and turns, we are still lawyers for poor people. When we
started on this road, we believed that we were making a political deci-
sion - that lawyering on behalf of poor people meant representing the
oppressed against entrenched interests, including the state. While we
may no longer say things like "when the revolution comes" (well,
sometimes we do), we still believe that choosing to represent the poor
is a political choice with dramatic consequences in the nature of one's
work.
Adam Babich may disagree, but the work of the Tulane Law
School's Environmental Law Clinic proves our point. Professor
Babich describes the clinic's environmentalist work on behalf of the
unenfranchised and calls it apolitical. It is a little bit like buying a gold
fish and telling everyone about your pet dog. You can call it what you
want, but you should not expect others to take it for a walk.
The "political interference" committee of the AALS Section on
Clinical Education has had to address outside attacks on law school
clinics primarily in situations involving environmental clinics.1 This
should come as no surprise. Unlike most (all?) other law school clin-
ics, environmental clinics, by definition, handle only cases that seek to
prevent government or industry from carrying out projects involving
land use, industrial development, and manufacturing that threaten the
environment through pollution, endangering species of animals, or de-
struction of or injury to natural resources.
If there is any clinic that is inherently "political," it is an environ-
mental clinic. Empowering individual citizens, or community groups,
to stand up to the powerful forces of government and industry by pro-
viding them with competent legal advocates is political, however one
defines that word. Politics is about interests and power. Environmen-
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1 For a comprehensive history of political interference with law school clinics see Rob-
ert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School Clinics, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1971 (2003).
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tal disputes involve the competing, and conflicting, interests of citizens
in preventing or reducing pollution, and in preserving the natural en-
vironment, versus the interests of government and industry in carrying
out development and manufacturing projects in the name of progress
or profit or both. Government and industry have political and eco-
nomic power. Most individuals and communities do not. Providing
competent, effective legal representation to affected individuals and
communities helps to "level the playing field" by empowering the rel-
atively weak to stand up to and oppose the inherently strong.
Because the role and the goal of environmental clinics, as defined
by Professor Babich, is "to represent those who could otherwise not
afford competent legal help on environmental issues" and to "giv[e] a
voice to clients who would not be heard otherwise", environmental
clinics are inherently "political", that is, they are designed to empower
those without power to assert their interests in opposition to the com-
peting interests of the rich and powerful.
Professor Babich purports to draw a distinction between adhering
to a commitment to professionalism and advancing a political agenda.
As applied to environmental clinics this is a false dichotomy, unless, of
course, a clinic was to represent, in different cases, the victims of envi-
ronmental misbehavior and its perpetrators. So long as the Tulane
environmental clinic, like ~ll environmental clinics of which we are
aware, represents only the victims of environmental misbehavior, or
organizations that advocate on behalf of environmental protection, in
opposition to proposals of government to engage in public works
projects or to grant permission to private business interests to engage
in environment-compromising activities, or in opposition to private
business initiatives involving industrial development or manufactur-
ing, the clinic's activities are essentially political, if operationally "le-
gal", in nature. That the Tulane clinic carries out this political work
professionally does not change its nature.
There is nothing new in Professor Babich's position. He has
taken a forty year old debate concerning the delivery of legal services
and recast it in different terms. The vocabulary has changed more
than the argument. As Alan Houseman and Linda Perle noted in
their recent history of legal services, the basic structure for the mod-
ern legal services program included the notion of "a commitment to
redress historic inadequacies in the enforcement of legal rights of poor
people caused by lack of access to those institutions that were in-
tended to protect those rights".2 Back in the 1970s, we called that "law
2 HOUSEMAN AND PERLE, SECURING LEGAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A BRIEF LEGAL HIS-
TORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSISTANCE IN THE UNITED STATES (2003).
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reform."3 As Gary Bellow and others noted,4 law reform may have
been a goal, but the large majority of legal services lawyers spent their
days on service cases, a practice dominated by routine domestic, hous-
ing and consumer matters.
That debate was transformed over the years to a question of "ac-
cess" vs. "impact."5 The access/impact debate was made more sophis-
ticated with the influence of client-based and cross-cultural lawyering
literature, as clinicians and legal services attorneys questioned the role
of the lawyer in setting community or client priorities.6 None of those
commentators, however, considered this to be a question devoid of
politics. To the contrary, some of the commentators most concerned
with politics objected to poor people's lawyers usurping priority set-
ting, arguing, among other things, that it was racist for white lawyers
to impose their views on communities of color.7
John Calmore, writing about "cause lawyers," believes this dis-
cussion must be considered in the context of the intersection of race,
space and poverty. Calmore rejects the impact approach of many
cause lawyers, stating that "practicing law in the community is not a
tourist adventure and, therefore, we must eschew the routine of the
autonomous, interloping advocate who dreams up cases in the home
office and then tests them on the community."8 This is not a call for
service or "apolitical" lawyering. Like Gerald Lopez, Calmore rejects
the service vs. impact dichotomy as "regnant" lawyering, urging in-
stead a collaborative community-based advocacy. Calmore argues that
effective lawyering requires collaboration with clients, not only to re-
3 See William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid:
Congress and the LSC from the 1960's to the 1990's, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. LAW REV. 241
(1998).
4 See Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34
NLADA Briefcase 106 (1977); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics:
Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Marshall Breger, Legal Services for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60
N.C. L. REv. 282 (1982); Deborah Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the
United States, 5 Loy. J. PUB. INT. 11 (2003); Geoffrey Hazard, Social Justice through Civil
Justice, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 699 (1968); EARL JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORM-
ATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM (1974).
6 See, e.g., GERALD LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).
7 See Paul E. Lee and Mary M. Lee, Reflections from the Bottom of the Well: Racial
Bias in the Provision of Legal Services to the Poor, 27 Clearinghouse Review 311 (1993).
For a fuller critique of the role of attorneys in "cause lawyering" see John O. Calmore, A
Call to Context: The Professional Challenge of Cause Lawyering at the Intersection ofRace,
Space and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927 (1999) and Ray Brescia, Robin Golden and
Robert Solomon, Who's in Charge, Anyway? A Proposal for Community-Based Legal Ser-
vices, 25 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 831 (1998).
8 Calmore, supra note 7 at 1956.
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present them, but to represent the interests of the community as well.9
While we agree with this approach, we believe that community-based
lawyering, which requires identifying community, negotiating compet-
ing interests and group work, requires more, not less politics.
We are currently involved in a mini-version of this debate in our
Community Lawyering Clinic, in which we provide outreach at vari-
ous locations in the New Haven community. Our largest outreach site
is at Junta for Progressive Action, a social services agency in the
center of New Haven's largest Hispanic community. When we asked
our colleague, Kica Matos, Junta's Executive Director and a lawyer, to
help define community legal issues, she told us that "access to law-
yers" is the primary issue. Matos believes that her community (unlike
us, she lives and works there) has been so underserved that providing
lawyers in the community is a sufficient aspiration.
Like the old legal services practices, virtually all of the Junta
cases are "service" cases, the only change being the large number of
immigration issues in the docket. Many of those individual cases pre-
sent deeper issues which may result in the opportunity for law reform.
Whether they head in that direction, however, is a decision for our
clients. We teach our students to offer a full range of legal services
including engaging in impact litigation that may be unpopular, result
in bad public relations, or annoy the University. But, as in Professor
Babich's clinic, it is our clients who make the decisions about which
legal services they need. We are currently litigating a class action
against Yale New Haven Hospital, which is not necessarily favored by
our employer. Our colleague Deborah Cantrell is representing a cli-
ent in a grievance against an alumnus, who complained to the law
school administration. We have made the choice that our clients, not
us, would decide the issues to litigate, but it is illusory to suggest that
we are not involved in the political nature of those decisions.
We subscribe fully to Professor Babich's three guiding principles:
(1) Law students should be educated to be capable, civil, and
ethical advocates. And, we would add, they should be inspired to be
socially responsible members of the legal profession.
(2) Legal representation should not be denied on the basis of
ability to pay or point of view. And, we would add, law students
should be inspired to value providing pro bono representation to cli-
ents who can not pay after they become members of the bar as central
to their ethical obligations as lawyers.
(3) Nobody is so rich or powerful as to be above the law. And,
we would add, law school clinics should inculcate in students the pro-
9 Id.
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fessional value of representing the poor and powerless in asserting
their rights against the rich and powerful.
These three guiding principles do not, in our opinion, define an
"apolitical" clinic. Quite the contrary. We believe that, taken to-
gether, and considering their full implications, they describe political
dimensions of a well-designed law school clinic.
Given the limited resources of clinical programs and legal ser-
vices offices, each of us makes a political decision when we decide
which cases to take. By choosing to go to Junta, we acquiesced to the
expressed wishes of our constituency of clinic students, who wanted to
provide legal services to an under-served, low-income community,
with a large Spanish-speaking clientele, many of whom were undocu-
mented workers, with problems heavily weighted towards immigra-
tion law. We also do outreach at an AIDS residence and a domestic
violence center. Those choices were also initiated by student desire to
represent particular communities. In our Immigration Clinic, our case
load consists entirely of political asylum cases. We have a Prison
Clinic, an International Human Rights Clinic and an Environmental
Clinic. Those are political choices, regardless of whether the cases re-
volve around service or law reform cases.
We believe that the choices about which clients a clinic will re-
present, and what types of cases the clinic will handle on behalf of
those clients, are political decisions. That seems to us particularly ob-
vious when the decision is to represent the poor and unenfranchised in
affirmative impact cases against the government and other institutions
with economic and political power when the clients' interests are in
conflict with those of their powerful adversaries. Of course, what a
clinic offers such clients is competent and ethical legal services, which
includes the ethical obligation to defer to the clients in setting the
objectives of the legal representation.
Professor Babich appears to conflate means and ends when he
makes the unconvincing claim that his clinic is "apolitical." Compe-
tent and ethical lawyering should be the hallmark of any law school
clinical program. But on whose behalf, in whose interests, and in what
form that lawyering should be deployed are separate issues. The deci-
sion to represent only low income clients who cannot afford the cost
of sophisticated environmental lawyers in affirmative cases seeking to
block governmental and industrial projects that threaten the environ-
ment is a political decision. Providing competent and ethical legal
representation to advocate a position decided on by the clients is what
it means to be a competent and ethical lawyer.
Based on Professor Babich's description, Tulane's Environmental
Law Clinic is quite political. While we appreciate his "efforts to man-
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age controversy" through a self-described "adoption of a self-con-
sciously apolitical philosophy," the fact remains that the clinic as a
"law firm of last resort" represents clients "the overwhelming major-
ity" of which "seek to reduce pollution or preserve natural resources."
By creating a construct which predetermines that a certain class of
client, i.e. those seeking to reduce pollution, is more likely to seek the
services of the clinic than those seeking to reduce oppressive environ-
mental regulation of business, Professor Babich has made a political
decision. In fact, given that these cases have been approved by an
Advisory Board appointed by the clinic, with standards that tend to
exclude business and industrial clients, the Tulane Environmental Law
Clinic is making decisions that are more politicized than many of us.
When we go to Junta, we ask whether there is a legal issue, not
whether the client meets predetermined standards set by our advisory
board.
Professor Babich presents this result more as coincidence than
plan, but the facts belie his argument. He states as a conclusion that
those who can pay would rather be represented by experienced law-
yers than law students and those who can pay rarely approach the
clinic for help. We accept this recitation, just as we accept that land-
lords rarely, if ever, approach our Landlord/Tenant Clinic for help. At
the same time, we have no question that many landlords, including
wealthy corporations, would jump at the chance to have free represen-
tation of the quality that they observe our students providing to their
adversaries.
In our Community and Economic Development Clinic, we re-
present the City of New Haven, a private foundation seeking to start a
community development bank and a coalition of municipalities and
non-profits seeking to reform Connecticut's school financing system,
all of which could pay legal fees, had they chosen to do so. In each of
these cases, our clients determined that it was advantageous to be rep-
resented by a clinical program willing to devote substantial resources
to their claims without facing the economic pressure of escalating le-
gal fees. On our part, representing the City of New Haven and a pri-
vate foundation offered the opportunity to form a community
development bank, a result that we and our students believed was im-
portant in creating future opportunities for New Haven's low-income
community. We and our clients each made a similar analysis in our
client's decision to retain us to assist in a challenge to Connecticut's
school finance system.
We are confident that the Tulane Law School's Environmental
Clinic would have no problem filling its docket by representing busi-
ness interests for free. We could be facetious and note that they could
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represent industrial polluters, but the issue is more nuanced than that.
Business interests, including affordable housing developers, fre-
quently are stymied by complex environmental regulations, which are
perceived by many of those interests as examples of over-regulation.
This is particularly true in any attempt to redevelop crowded urban
sites, where any redevelopment often depends on demolition or build-
ing on brownfie1ds. In a truly apolitical world, the Tulane Clinic
would be representing at least one such client. We are glad that they
have made the political decision to do otherwise.
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